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Abstract
Location fingerprinting is a technique employed when Global Positioning System
(GPS) positioning breaks down within indoor environments. Since Location Ser-
vice Providers (LSPs) would implicitly have access to such information, preserv-
ing user privacy has become a challenging issue in location estimation systems.
This paper proposes a low-complexity k -anonymity approach for preserving the
privacy of user location and trajectory, in which real location/trajectory data is
hidden within k fake locations/trajectories held by the LSP, without degrading
overall localization accuracy. To this end, three novel location privacy preserv-
ing methods and a trajectory privacy preserving algorithm are outlined. The
fake trajectories are generated so as to exhibit characteristics of the user’s real
trajectory. In the proposed method, no initial knowledge of the environment or
location of the Access Points (APs) is required in order for the user to generate
the fake location/trajectory. Moreover, the LSP is able to preserve privacy of
the fingerprinting database from the users. The proposed approaches are eval-
uated in both simulation and experimental testing, with the proposed methods
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outperforming other well-known k -anonymity methods. The method further
exhibits a lower implementation complexity and higher movement similarity (of
up to 88%) between the real and fake trajectories.
Keywords: Location Privacy-Preserving, Trajectory
Privacy-Preserving, Fingerprinting Positioning, k -anonymity.
1. Introduction
Indoor Positioning Systems (IPSs) are used for navigation inside of build-
ings, for example, to localize customers in commercial stores, or to rescue people
in emergency situations. Various IPS services are designed for positioning pur-
poses based on geographic information in conjunction with the Received Signal5
Strength Intensity (RSSI) from Wi-Fi Access Points (APs). The information
measured at a single location, constuting the “Fingerprint”, is saved by the
Location Service Provider (LSP) as part of the fingerprinting radio map. This
radio map consists of Reference Point (RP) coordinates and the measured RSSI
[1]. In fingerprinting positioning, users are localized by comparing their RSSI10
values with the RP information stored by the LSP. However, this positioning
technology potentially threatens user privacy due to the user’s locations and
trajectories being held by the LSP.
User trajectory tracking without explicit legal consent is generally considered
a privacy violation as it potentially also exposes places of interest, social lives,15
even psychological aspects of the individual [2]. In this paper, it is assumed
that LSPs are adversarial with respect to the user, and may provide the user’s
spatial information to unauthorized third parties or other LSPs. For instance,
consumer interest in specific products in a store may be important for competitor
stores and advertising agencies. Similarly, monitoring of patient location in20
a healthcare-related context may lead to insurance-relevent information being
exposed. Therefore, it is critical to preserve patient/consumer location and
trajectory information [3, 4].
In this paper, privacy preservation of users with respect to their locations
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and trajectories during fingerprint positioning is addressed. In the proposed25
privacy preservation method, k -1 fake locations and trajectories employing a
signal path-loss model are generated in order to incorporate k -anonymity in the
trajectories. The contributions of the paper are summarized as follows:
1) Three different algorithms are proposed for preserving user location privacy
by generating fake fingerprints for fake locations, making it possible to con-30
trol the distance between the real and fake user location.
2) A low-complexity algorithm is introduced for preserving user trajectory pri-
vacy by generating fake trajectories with high movement similarity between
the real and fake trajectories. No encryption, hash functions, or clustering
are required.35
3) The proposed methods are able to preserve the privacy of the LSP’s finger-
print database by preventing any additional information leakage concerning
the fingerprinting radio map, including measured fingerprints and location
of RPs or APs.
4) The proposed methods are also able to maintain the localization accuracy40
identical to that prior to applying the privacy preservation algorithm to the
fingerprinting network (more complicated methods tend to degrade position-
ing accuracy).
The structure of the paper is follows: in Section 2, the basics of fingerprinting
positioning and privacy protection methods are outlined. Section 3 describes45
the proposed privacy preservation method. The proposed method is assessed via
simulation and experimental testing in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2. Related Work
In this section we give a review of previous studies concerning fingerprint50
positioning and related privacy-preservion methods.
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2.1. Fingerprint Positioning Technique
There is substantial extent research in the localization field, the most com-
mon technology being Global Positioning System-based (GPS-based) [5]. How-
ever, this typically fails within buildings due to the sharp drop in the inten-55
sity of satellite signals [6]. Alternative methods available for positioning such
as ground-based navigation systems (e.g., LOng RAnge Navigation (LORAN)
and SHOrt RAnge Navigation (SHORAN) System), Inertial Navigation System
(INS), infrared localization, audio/video analytical localization [7, 8] typically
require additional infrastructure such as transmitters, antennas and specific60
radars, all of which need to be deployed and adjusted before the actual local-
ization procedure.
In fingerprinting positioning, however, existing Wi-Fi APs are employed as
signal transmitters with the receivers being the users’ smartphones [9]. Finger-
printing positioning consists of two phases: training (offline) and localization65
(online). The offline process collects RSSI from all existing APs at the known
RPs and stores them along with the (x, y) coordinates of the RPs in the fin-
gerprinting database [10]. The recorded RSSI matrix has a N ×M dimension,
where N , M are the number of RPs and APs, respectively. The fingerprint at
a location (xi, yi) is given as Fi= [RSSIi1, RSSIi2, ..., RSSIiM ], where RSSIij70
is the RSSI of APj at the i
th RP. In the localization phase, the user creates a
vector of RSSIs from the fingerprints of its location and sends it to the LSP.
The LSP then calculates the best match location (x, y) by comparing the RSSI
of the user with the RSSI of all RPs formerly stored in the database. There
are many matching algorithms that can be used in fingerprinting localization.75
The most common algorithms fall into one of two classes; probabilistic (e.g.,
Bayesian algorithms) [1] and deterministic (e.g., Nearest Neighbor (NN), K-
Nearest Neighbor (KNN), and weighted KNN (WKNN)) [1, 9]. The procedure
for fingerprinting localization in both the offline and online phases is shown in
Figure 1.80
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Figure 1: Fingerprinting localization technique.
2.2. Privacy-Preserving Methods
In this section, related privacy-preserving concerns are addressed. In the
privacy challenge, insider and outsider attackers are considered the two main
threats. Insider attackers are malicious or curious parts of the network, while
outsider attackers are third parties or other out-of-network operators [11]. In85
fingerprinting positioning, LSPs are treated as trusted parties and user location
privacy is revealed for them. However, this is a serious privacy risk when facing
curious LSPs. Therefore, in this section, after addressing the main privacy-
preserving concepts, related studies on the user’s privacy preserving against
curious LSPs are reviewed.90
One of the most important methods to protect users’ privacy is using a
pseudo-identifier [12]. The Pseudo-identifier is considered as an interface be-
tween the data and certain characteristics of the user, such as birth, gen-
der, postal code, and so on. Modifying these attributes results in a quasi-
identification. The Pseudo-identifier tries to change these features, so that users95
cannot be identified and tracked [13]. In location privacy, these mechanisms are
divided into three general categories: ambiguity, anonymity, and cryptography.
In ambiguity mechanisms, the spatial resolution of the user is decreased to pre-
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serve the exact level of their presence. In some cases, a set of fake locations is
produced for the user to protect their privacy [14]. Points Of Interest (PoI) and100
adding random data are two examples of ambiguity methods [15]. The main
idea behind anonymity mechanisms is to hide the user amongst k -1 different
users, known as k -anonymity [16]. In this method, the probability of identifying
the user is 1/k with a guarantee of hiding the user among k -1 users [15, 16].
Other methods are based on cryptography; these generally impose a significant105
computational overhead on the system [17]. A combination of the above pri-
mary methods can be also used to increase users’ privacy levels. For instance,
[18] proposes a new model for preserving the user privacy by combining PoI in
the populated areas with double encryptions in sparse blocks.
Most of the aforementioned methods assume an outside privacy attacker and110
are not able to hide the user from the LSP. In order to address this challenge
with respect to a curious LSP, authors in [19] reduced LSP knowledge about user
location by using a k -anonymity Bloom (k -AB) filter and sending a Partial Radio
Map (PRM) to the user. The user determines the 1/k relevent probabilities for
his/her security and conceals themself between k other users, finally estimating115
their location by using the PRM, such that the LSP can only estimates user
location with a 1/k probability. However, sending PRM to the users still reveals
the privacy of the fingerprinting database. Authors in [20] proposed a privacy
protection method utilizing homomorphic encryption and Paillier cryptosystem
and claim they can protect the user’s location privacy and the LSP’s database120
at the same time. However, authors in [21] showed that the technique in [20]
cannot preserve LSP’s database information, because homomorphic encryption
methods send the nearest distance vector of the fingerprint database to the user
and expose the LSB’s fingerprint database. Therefore, a malicious user can
exploit the fingerprinting database by sending some specific fingerprint (e.g.125
zero fingerprint) to the LSP [21]. Authors in [21] introduced four methods to
prevent this threat and they explained a model in [22] for Wi-Fi based indoor
localization using Paillier encryption or Semi-Trusted Third Parties (STTPs)
which preserve the user location privacy and LSP’s fingerprint database.
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Authors in [23] improved their previous method in [21] and provided a130
method for protecting users’ privacy adopting the secret sharing encryption
and the use of two STTPs with secure channel communication. They mapped
the 8-bit RSSI to 4-bit values to reduce the network transmission traffic and
to make faster localization process. This method works faster than other intro-
duced methods due to the use of 4-bit values, however, the average positioning135
error increases about 0.1-5% compared to the case that 8-bit values are used.
Authors in [24] suggested scanning various active 802.11 Wi-Fi signals to
preserve the user’s privacy in indoor fingerprinting positioning in both the online
and offline phases, regarding active Wi-Fi scanning as a kind of privacy leakage.
In their method, a mobile device passively listens to the beacons’ signal and140
determines the valid RSSI fingerprints, and does not send any signal out. They
further improved their solution in [25] by introducing an obfuscating approach
in fingerprinting positioning via a passive scanning procedure. In [25], all Wi-Fi
signals are scanned offline by the frequency hopping technique in different time
intervals, and in the online phase real RSSIs are scanned and the localization145
is carried out by deterministic and probabilistic approaches. Wang et al. [26]
addressed the privacy problem in terms of client location and LSB database.
They proposed a Differential Privacy (DP)-based privacy-preserving for IPS,
which includes four phases, AP fuzzification, location retrieval, DP-based finger
clustering and finger permutation. The two first phases run on the user’s device150
and the two last phases run in the LSP. Finally, the authors in [27] introduced
a method for producing a forged trajectory using a dummy signal strength. In
this method, the user is required to estimate the location of APs. Therefore,
the user needs to have a basic knowledge of the environment and to know RSSI




In this section, the proposed methods for preserving location and trajectory
privacy from curious LSPs are described. All of the proposed methods, can be
considered as an instance of the k -anonymity method, as the user hides their160
real location/trajectory between k -1 other locations/trajectories, so the LSP or
attackers can only estimate the location of the user with a 1/k probability, in
which k (k > 1) is pre-specified by the user.
The major differences of the proposed methods with the previous research
described in Section 2 are as follows: here, we propose a low-complexity privacy165
preserving algorithm in which no encryption methods or hash functions are
required to preserve users’ location/trajectory privacy; therefore, no preparation
steps or key exchange phases are required. With no encryption procedure, the
proposed method can also work faster than those using encryption methods.
Moreover, utilizing the suggested algorithm in a location fingerprinting system170
does not increase the localization error and maintains the same level of accuracy
as before. In addition, the full radio map or PRM is not accessible to users.
Hence, it preserves the LSP’s fingerprint database at the same time. Finally,
unlike [27], no knowledge about AP locations and measured fingerprints in the
indoor environment are necessary in the proposed methods.175
3.1. Location Privacy-preservation
To protect the location privacy of the user, first we need to preserve the ac-
tual fingerprints of the user. Therefore, the proposed method initially generates
k -1 fake fingerprint vectors, all of which are sent to the LSP along with the real
fingerprint of the user, Fu. All of these k elements are placed in an arbitrary180
order in a vector, denoted by FP, as FP=[F1, F2, ..., Fk]. In other words,
FP includes k F vectors, only one of which is the true fingerprint of the user,
Fu. The LSP sends back k locations in a vector as Loc = [Loc1, Loc2, ..., Lock],
without knowing which are the true or fake F vectors. However, the user knows
the index of the true F in the FP vector, so it is able to choose the correspond-185
ing location in the Loc vector received from the LSP. From the LSP’s point
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of view, the location of the user can be any of those k locations. Therefore,
the probability of identifying the true location of the user is 1/k. These fake
fingerprints are made with three different algorithms explained in subsection
3.1.1. The protocol for preserving user location privacy from the LSP is shown190
in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 User Side Location Privacy-Preserving Protocol.
Output: k Locations (one real and k -1 fake locations)
1: Scan the RSSI and create Fu
2: Select a random positive number k (k > 1)
3: Generate k -1 fake F vectors (F1, F2, ..., Fk−1)
4: Send FP vector,[F1, F2, ..., Fk], to the LSP (knowing Fi is Fu)
5: Get [Loc1, Loc2, ..., Lock] from LSP
6: Select Loci as the real location
For example, assume that the user RSSI vector from five existing APs is Fu=
(-75, -65, -60, -80, -70) dBm. Selecting k = 3, the user produces two fake F
vectors and sends FP = [F1, F2, F3] to the LSP in an arbitrary order, knowing
which element is the true index. The LSP then sends back three locations195
corresponding to these F vectors and the user can recognize its true location.
In this case, the LSP can only estimates the true location of the user with a
1/3 probability. Algorithm (2) shows the implementation of this protocol in the
server.
Algorithm 2 Server Side Location Privacy-Preservation Protocol.
Input: k F vectors ( [F1, F2, ..., Fk] )
Output: k Locations ([Loc1, Loc2, ..., Lock])
1: Receive FP vector([F1, F2, ..., Fk]) from the user u
2: For each Fi in FP vector Calculate Loci
3: Send [Loc1, Loc2, ..., Lock] back to the user u
3.1.1. Methods for Generating Fake Fingerprints200
For generating the fake fingerprint vectors, three methods are herein out-
lined: random fingerprints, random permutations, and smart permutations.
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Random fingerprints : Fake F vectors are generated by selecting values in
the range of [-24, -110] dBm, which is the typical RSSI range for Wi-Fi signals.
The maximum value of -24 dBm is chosen as the nearest distance to the AP205
(note that this value is obtained in our actual measurements). -110 dBm is
considered to represent the absence of signals from the AP. Here, fake locations
are completely random, and the user cannot change them.
Random permutation: This method utilizes a random permutation of the
RSSIs in the real FP vector. In order to generate the fake F vectors, users can210
change the order of elements in the real Fu. If there are M APs in the area, there




 fake F vectors. In order to create the FP vector then, the
F vectors can have k! orders. Hence, if the user sends r requests for localization
to the LSP, there are Pr = r × k!×
 M !
k − 1
 possible locations for the user.215
By increasing k, the location privacy of the user is increasingly preserved.
Smart Permutation: Here, the fake F vectors are chosen via a smart method
such that the user can control the generated fake locations, producing them
according to specific distances to the real location. This method is based on the
principle that the user generally receives a strong RSSI value from the nearest220
AP and a weak RSSI value from the farther one. In the smart permutation
method, users select an arbitrary percentage number (Per) and change Per%
of the elements in the Fu vector. The user can select the value of Per based on
the level of protection needed. The higher Per values in the smart permutation
method result in a larger average distance between the real and fake locations,225
which provides higher level of protection. In order to obtain the furthest fake
location possible, users carry out replacement of the maximum elements of the
Fu vector with the minimum ones and vice versa until Per% of all elements
have been replaced altogether. In this smart method, if the intensities of the
two APs with the highest and lowest values are displaced together, the distance230
between the real and the fake locations also increases. However, if the RSSI
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values of two APs are roughly the same, the intensity of the signals in the fake
fingerprint, obtained via the Fu, is approximately the same and the real and
fake locations will be also close to each other. Algorithm (3) shows the proposed
smart permutation of the real Fu vector. In this method, the user can change235
Per% of Fu elements. If Per is 100% all of Fu elements are changed.
Algorithm 3 Create Fake FP by Smart Permutation.
Input: Fu and Permutation Percent (Per)
Output: Fake F
1: Fake F = Fu
2: repeat
3: while Max and Min RSSI values are changed do
4: Select next Max and Min RSSI
5: end while
6: Swap(Max and Min RSSI in Fake F)
7: until (Per% elements of the Fake F are changed )
8: return Fake F
3.2. Trajectory Privacy-Preserving
If the user is moving, the generated fake F vectors might produce some
locations irrelevant to the previous location of the user. Therefore, it is possible
for the LSP to monitor and analyze all estimated locations of the user and look240
for the most related and rational ones based on the spatial distances and request
times, as well as the average speed of the person in question. Hence, we need
to protect the trajectory of the user at the same time.
In the proposed method, fake F vectors have been modified according to
real changes in Fu such that unauthorized observers or LSPs would not be245
able to distinguish the difference between the real and fake trajectories. For
this purpose, a distance-calculation method using a path-loss model is used to
calculate the variations of user’s real location and change the fake F vectors
accordingly. In many studies, signal propagation inside buildings is modeled by
11




(PTX − PRX +GTX +GRX −Xα + 20 log λ− 20 log(4π)) (1)
where N is the path-loss exponent (PE), d is the estimated distance between
the transmitter and the receiver, and PTX and PRX(dBm) are the transmitted
and received powers, respectively. GTX and GRX(dBi) are the antenna gains
of the transmitter and receiver. λ(m) denotes the wavelength of the signal and
Xα models the path-loss variation at one point due to the shadowing caused by255
obstacles in propagation assumed to be a zero mean Gaussian random variable
with a standard deviation given by α. The standard deviation of Xα is in the
range of 3 to 20 dB, depending on the construction of the building and the
number of partitions the signal passes through [28]. The distance d can be
computed using equation (2) as follows.260
d = 10
(
(PTX − PRX +GTX +GRX −Xα + 20 log λ− 20 log(4π))/10n
)
(2)
3.2.1. Proposed Method for Trajectory Privacy Preservation
The initial points for the fake trajectories are generated using the methods
proposed in subsection 3.1.1. As the user relocates and receives new signal
strengths from the APs, the fake F vectors should change accordingly. Suppose
that in the previous example, after the user is translated to the new location,265
Fu has been changed to Fu = (-85,-59,-65,-82,-68) dBm. The difference between
these two vectors is DFu = (-10,+6,-5,-2,+2). The changes indicate that the
user moves away from the first, third and fourth APs and closer to the second
and fifth APs.
To preserve the trajectory, the F vector of the other k -1 fake locations will270
also need to change accordingly. By utilizing DFu and Equation (2), we are
able to calculate the appropriate distances that the user should move in relation
to different APs. According to these distance calculations, the RSSI values of
the new fake locations are incremented or decremented with respect to the
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RSSI values of their previous locations. There is, however, the possibility that275
changing the fake RSSI values generates an out-of-range ([-24,-110] dBm) value.
In this case, we reverse the movement direction in the fake trajectory with regard
to that particular AP.
To improve trajectory preservation in the proposed method, the specific PE
of the area of interest is used in (2) instead of generalised values. Hence, we280
suppose that LSP has the PE values corresponding to each AP and sends a
M-element Path-loss Exponent Vector (PEV) along with the estimated Loc
vector to the user. Then, the user employs PEV to create the next fake loca-
tion. The proposed method for preserving the user’s trajectory is presented in
Algorithm 4). As the user creates k -1 fake trajectories alongside the real one,285
the probability of the trajectory correctly tracking is 1/k.
4. Performance Evaluation
The proposed methods are verified via simulation and experimental testing;
the results are presented in this section.
4.1. Numerical Results on Simulated Data290
In the simulation of the localization process and production of the fake tra-
jectories, we employ an area of dimensions 100m × 100m without obstacles.
There are 9 APs and 100 RPs in the simulated environment. In the simulation
process, the power of the APs and receivers are assumed to be 20dBm with fre-
quency 2.4GHz; the antennas’ gain is 5dBi, and λ is 0.12m. Signal variations295
are assumed to have a Gaussian distribution, N(0, 5). The localization process’s
requests are simulated by a Poisson random variable and the users’ trajectory
is simulated via a Random Walk simulation model [30].
Figure 2 shows an example implemention of the proposed method on the
simulated data for 20 localization requests. In Figure 2, the location of APs300
and RPs are shown with red crosses and black dots. The real user trajectory is
plotted as a green line and the four fake trajectories via four dashed lines. In a
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Algorithm 4 User Trajectory Privacy-Preservation Protocol.
Input: Fu Vector
Output: Fake F Related to the Real Trajectory
? ↓ ? User Side (Location Privacy) ? ↓ ?
1: Scan the location RSSI and create the Fu vector
2: Select a random, positive integer k (k > 1)
3: Create k -1 Fake F vectors base on different Per% values
4: Send FP vector (FP=[F1, F2, ..., Fk]) to the LSP
? ↓ ? Server Side (Localization Process) ? ↓ ?
5: Estimate k locations
6: Generate PEV
7: Send [Loc1, Loc2, , Lock] and PEV to the user
? ↓ ? User Side (Trajectory Privacy) ? ↓ ?
8: User selects its real location and stores the other k -1 fake locations for
creating k -1 fake trajectories
9: Move to the new location
10: Scan RSSI and create new Fu vector
11: Calculate DFu
12: Calculate the distance (d) from each AP with equation (2)
13: Changing the RSSI values of Fake F vectors using (d) and PEV
14: for each invalid RSSIj value in the Fake F vector do
15: Reverse Trajectory Direction from APj
16: Change RSSIj value using new direction
17: end for
18: Create the real and Fake F vectors
19: Send FPs to the LSP and Start Server Side Section
new localization request, the RSSI values of the fake F vectors change according
to the difference in the new and previous Fu vector. As it can be seen in Figure
2, there are four created trajectories in addition to the real one. We see that305
the progression of the real and fake trajectories are practically identical, and
the probability of discovering the real trajectory is 1/5.
14
Figure 2: An example of the proposed method on the simulated data when k=5 and four fake
trajectories are generated alongside the real one.
4.2. Experimental Test and Results
In order to evaluate the proposed method in realistic situations, we setup a
real-world experiment (we shall first detail the experimental testing; the result310
of location privacy preservation using the suggested three methods for the fake
fingerprints generation are then discussed, and finally the proposed method for
trajectory privacy preserving is analyzed).
4.2.1. Experimental Setup
The RSS fingerprint samples are recorded by a Samsung Galaxy SM-J500H315
smartphone over two days using two developed Android-based applications, the
first for data-acquisition from existing APs, in which RSSI values and Media
Access Control (MAC) addresses of sensed APs are simultaneously sent to the
server and recorded (Wampserver software is utilized for the server side); the
second is for the localization process. The testbed is located in the Cyberspace320
Research Institute at Shahid Beheshti University with an approximate dimen-
sion of 17m × 50m. In this experiment, there are nine Wi-Fi APs located in
the ceilings. To build the fingerprinting database, the RSSI at 354 RPs are
measured in four directions (North, South, West and East, each direction 100
samples). The size of the fingerprinting database is 6.4MB. We also calculate325
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the PEV including the path-loss exponent of all nine APs, PEV=[3.64, 3.51,
4.28, 3.21, 4.27, 4.26, 4.27, 5.33, 4.91]. The average value of PE is 3.7 for the
entire area. Figure 3 displays the map of the surveyed environment. In this fig-
ure, red-cross and black dotted are represented the APs and RPs, respectively.
The location algorithm is implemented via the KNN method when K = 4, as330
this has demonstrated the best positioning accuracy.
Figure 3: Testbed layout showing the locations of APs (red-crosses), and RPs (black dots).
4.2.2. Results on Generated Fake Fingerprints
Here, three proposed algorithms for generating the fake locations are com-
pared. Table 1 represents the implementation of suggested methods for produc-
ing fake locations, with each method executed 100 times. In Table 1, the first335
row shows the localization error for the estimated locations of all RPs using the
KNN leave-one-out method. In this case, the average distance error from the
user’s real location is 1.11m. In the second and third rows, random fingerprints
and random permutations of the real fingerprints are shown. They provide an
average distance of 7.38m and 6.25m between the real and fake locations, re-340
spectively. However as indicated before, the user cannot control the distance in
these two algorithms. The last row of Table 1 represents the smart permutation
method, in which for Per = 100%, we can achieve an average distance of 11.45m
from the true location. However, changing 25% of elements only gives an aver-
age distance of 1.56m. Therefore, higher Per values in the smart permutation345
method result in a larger average distance between the real and fake locations.
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Table 1: Distance between the real and fake user locations after 100 interations of fake location
generation.
Distance from User
Generated Fake Method Parameters Real Location (m)
Avg. Max. Min.
Only Localization Process KNN , K=4 1.11 6.31 0.02
Random Fingerprints Random[-110,-15] 7.38 21.50 0.40
Random Permutation Permutation 6.25 21.28 0.37
Smart Permutation
25% 1.56 6.11 0.15
60% 3.67 18.81 0.21
100% 11.45 19.74 0.76
4.2.3. Results on Generated Fake Trajectories
The proposed fake trajectories are analyzed and compared with the real
one here. Figure 4 illustrates the results of the proposed method using the
actual measured data for k = 5 and 20 localization requests. Figure 4-(a)350
utilizes the average PE of n = 3.7 for all APs whereas Figure 4-(b) uses the
corresponding PEs for each APs. In these figures, a green solid line represents
the real trajectory and the other four fake lines are shown with blue, black, red
and turquoise dashed lines. As it can be seen in Figure 4, the moving speed of
the user is kept almost similar in all fake trajectories and there is no sharp jump355
for them. Therefore, the proposed method is able to hide the real trajectory
between four other fake trajectories.
In Table 2, the average movements of the user in the proposed method are
shown for 100 localization requests when the average PE and PEV are used.
The average user’s movement between two positioning requests in the real tra-360
jectory is 1.78m and in four fake trajectories is 1.58m employing PEV. The
results indicate that the proposed method can maintain the similarity between
the real and fake trajectories. Furthermore, Table 2 shows the movement sim-
ilarity between the real and fake trajectories is 88% when PEV is utilized,
whereas using the average PE decreases the similarity value to 77%. Due to365
the achieved high similarity, it would be difficult to distinguish the real user
trajectory based on the user’s movements.
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(a) The average PE (n = 3.7) for all APs.
(b) The specific PEV vector for each AP.
Figure 4: Results of the proposed method using the actual measured data for k = 5 and 20
localization requests (green line is real and other line are four fake trajectories)
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n = 3.7 PEV






Average(1th ∼ 4th) 0.86 1.58
Difference Between Real and
0.26 0.20
Average (1th ∼ 4th) Fake Trajectories
Figure 5 is the screenshot of our mobile application in a real situation for
trajectory privacy preservation with k = 3 and four positioning requests. Green
squares show the real trajectory of the user and the black/blue signs are two370
fake trajectories. The average user’s movement between two positioning requests
in the real and two fake trajectories are 2.95m, 2.84m and 2.96m, respectively,
which shows highly correlating movements between them. When positioning re-
quests are increased from 4 to 100, the average difference of movements between
the real and fake trajectories is 0.25m.375
Figure 5: A screenshot of our mobile application in a real situation of trajectory privacy
preservation for four positioning requests (Green squares are the real trajectory. Black circles
and blue pluses show the two fake trajectories).
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Table 3 compares the proposed method with the methods presented in [19],
[20], [23], [26] and [27] for 100 localization requests and k = 5. The Table shows
that localization errors do not change in the proposed method and [27] after
employing privacy preserving algorithms since they utilize the LSP fingerprint
database information and KNN method for localization. The algorithm in [27]380
needs to know different real locations and their measured fingerprints to esti-
mate APs’ location, whereas the suggested method here does not need such
information. Using PRM and k -AB filter in [19], homomorphic cryptography
in [20], reducing the required RSSI bits in [23] and clustering methods in [26]
degrade the localization accuracy.385
Furthermore, the computational overhead in the proposed method is much
lower than [20], [23] and [26] and more straightforward than [19] and [27] as
it does not employ any cryptographic or clustering process or hash function.
Moreover, the proposed method does not require a secure channel as it is needed
in [23] to communicate with the STTPs. The proposed method can also preserve390
the LSP’s fingerprinting database similar to [23], [26] and [27], whereas users
have access to PRM in [19]. In addition, user motion similarity with respect
to the real and fake trajectories of the proposed method is the highest overall
(88%), implying the movements in the fake trajectories are very similar to those
of the real trajectory although the proposed privacy preserving algorithm is395
intrinsically less complicated, and no information about the fingerprints and

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The movement similarity to average localization error ratio is shown in the
eighth row of Table 3. Higher values of this ratio for a given method indicate the
relative benefits of that method over the others. For the the same movements,400
the method that degrades the positioning accuracy the most receives the lowest
ratio value. Likewise, between two methods with the same localization errors,
the one with a lower movement similarity provides a lower ratio value. This
ratio for the suggested method is 0.79, the highest overall among the tested
methods, demonstrating the advantage of the proposed algorithm in preserving405
trajectory privacy. Finally, the last row of Table 3 shows the maximum running
time occurred for the algorithms specified in [20], [26], and [19] as they used
cryptographical concepts, clustering methods, and hash functions along with
user side activities on PRMs, respectively. Although the proposed method is
slower than the method introduced in [23] (because [23] uses 4-bit RSSI values),410
our proposed method provides a higher localization accuracy. The running times
given in [27] and that of the proposed methods are the same; the proposed
method is slightly faster, however.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, a class of low-complexity privacy preservation methods are415
proposed for user location/trajectory without employing hash functions or en-
cryption algorithms. In the location privacy preserving method, the user is
hidden among k−1 fake locations by using smart permutation of fingerprints to
produce fake locations. In the suggested trajectory privacy preserving method,
fake trajectories are generated by the user without knowing any information420
about the environment or the measured fingerprints. Employing the proposed
algorithms in the location fingerprinting system does not decrease the position-
ing accuracy. In the fake trajectories approach, the user movement character-
istics are kept almost similar to the real trajectory. By utilizing the proposed
method, we have demonstrated that it is possible to achieve up to 88% movement425
similarity between the real and fake trajectories. Therefore, the possibility of
22
trajectory detection by curious LSPs is greatly reduced. The proposed method
is not only is able to preserve the location and trajectory of the user but also
protect the fingerprinting database at the same time, as the LSP does not send
any additional information or PRM to the user. For future work, we will seek430
to use the proposed method for outdoor localization in order to demonstrate its
versatility. We also propose to improve fake trajectories by identifying obsta-
cles and walls in order to avoid sudden trajectory transitions. Finally, we will
try to decrease the running time with methods such as the RSSI bit mapping
introduced in [23].435
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